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Paper: Influence of complex network topologies on nash equilibria in static games under dynamic simulations
Volume 82, article number 397, (2026) Published: 05 May 2026
Cite this article :
Shafaati, S., Azimi, M., Mohammadzadeh, J. et al. Influence of complex network topologies on nash equilibria in static games under dynamic simulations. J Supercomput 82, 397 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-026-08421-9
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-026-08421-9
Full version: https://rdcu.be/fg6oG
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This project simulates the evolution of strategies in 2-player static games using agent-based modeling on various types of complex networks. It explores how network topology and different strategy update rules influence the convergence toward Nash equilibria.
- Model strategic behavior of agents playing classic games (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma) on networks.
- Examine how different update mechanisms (e.g., replicator dynamics, imitation) affect strategy evolution.
- Evaluate how network types (e.g., scale-free, small-world, community-based) influence the emergence and stability of Nash equilibria.
- Nash Equilibrium: A state where no agent can improve its payoff by unilaterally changing strategy.
- Agent-Based Modeling: Each node in the network is an agent with an evolving strategy.
- Evolutionary Game Theory: Agents adapt strategies based on payoff-based learning or imitation.
- Complex Networks: Topologies used include:
- Erdos-Renyi (random)
- Barabasi-Albert (scale-free)
- Watts-Strogatz (small-world)
- Complete graph
- Homogeneous (regular)
- LFR benchmark (community-rich)
Classic 2-player games are defined using payoff matrices:
- Prisoner's Dilemma
- Hawk-Dove
- Stag Hunt
- Public Goods Game (function-based)
Creates networks using networkx, supporting:
- Random graphs
- Scale-free networks
- Small-world networks
- Modular/community-based graphs via LFR
Implements various strategy dynamics:
Static: No change in strategyReplicator: Strategies reproduced in proportion to payoffsUnconditional Imitation: Agents copy the highest earnerMoran: Reproducer and replacer selected probabilisticallyFermi Rule: Random comparisons with payoff-based imitation
- Proportion of strategies over time
- Average payoff and system-wide fitness
- Community cohesion and internal/external cooperation
- Nash Equilibrium detection (by verifying strategy stability)
- Convergence patterns (e.g., consensus, coexistence, oscillation)
Plots include:
- Evolution of strategy proportions
- Network diagrams showing agent strategies
- Community-based heatmaps
- Stability over time
Install required Python packages:
pip install numpy pandas networkx matplotlib seaborn